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Abstract—Recently, authenticating users with the help of their
friends (i.e., trustee-based social authentication) has been shown
to be a promising backup authentication mechanism [4, 7, 8,
24]. A user in this system is associated with a few trustees that
were selected from the user’s friends. When the user wants to
regain access to the account, the service provider sends different
verification codes to the user’s trustees. The user must obtain
at least k (i.e., recovery threshold) verification codes from the
trustees before being directed to reset his or her password.
In this paper, we provide the first systematic study about
the security of trustee-based social authentications. Specifically,
we first introduce a novel framework of attacks, which we call
forest fire attacks. In these attacks, an attacker initially obtains
a small number of compromised users, and then the attacker
iteratively attacks the rest of users by exploiting trustee-based
social authentications. Then, we construct a probabilistic model
to formalize the threats of forest fire attacks and their costs
for attackers. Moreover, we introduce various defense strategies.
Finally, we apply our framework to extensively evaluate various
concrete attack and defense strategies using three real-world
social network datasets. Our results have strong implications for
the design of more secure trustee-based social authentications.
Index Terms—Social authentication, security model, backup
authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web services (e.g., Gmail, Facebook, and online Bankings)
today most commonly rely on passwords to authenticate users.
Unfortunately, two serious issues in this paradigm are: users
will inevitably forget their passwords, and their passwords
could be compromised and changed by attackers, which result
in the failures to access their own accounts.
Therefore, web services often provide users with backup
authentication mechanisms to help users regain access to
their accounts. Unfortunately, current widely used backup
authentication mechanisms such as security questions and
alternate email addresses are insecure or unreliable or both.
Previous works [5, 23, 27] have shown that security questions
are easily guessable and phished, and that users might forget
their answers to the security questions. A previously registered
alternate email address might expire upon the user’s change of
school or job. For the above reasons, it is important to design
a secure and reliable backup authentication mechanism.
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Recently, trustee-based social authentication has attracted
increasing attentions and has been shown to be a promising
backup authentication mechanism [4, 7, 8, 24]. Brainard
et al. [4] first proposed trustee-based social authentication
and combined it with other authenticators (e.g., password,
security token) as a two-factor authentication mechanism.
Later, trustee-based social authentication was adapted to be
a backup authenticator [7, 8, 24]. In particular, Schechter et
al. [24] designed and built a prototype of trusted-based social
authentication system which was integrated into Microsoft’s
Windows Live ID. Schechter et al. found that trustee-based
social authentication is highly reliable. Moreover, Facebook
announced its trustee-based social authentication system called
Trusted Friends in October, 2011 [8], and it was redesigned
and improved to be Trusted Contacts [7] in May, 2013.
However, these previous work either focus on security at
individual levels [4, 24] or totally ignore security [7, 8]. In
fact, security of users are correlated in trustee-based social
authentications, in contrast to traditional authenticators (e.g.,
passwords, security questions, and fingerprint) where security
of users are independent. Specifically, a user’s security in
trustee-based social authentications relies on the security of
his or her trustees; if all trustees of a user are already
compromised, then the attacker can also compromise him or
her because the attacker can easily obtain the verification
codes from the compromised trustees. The impact of this
key difference has not been touched. Moreover, none of the
existing work has studied the fundamental design problems
such as how to select trustees for users so that the system
is more secure and how to set the system parameters (e.g.,
recovery threshold) to balance between security and usability.
Our work: In this paper, we aim to provide the first
systematic study about the security of trustee-based social
authentications. To this end, we first propose a novel frame-
work of attacks that are based on the observation that users’
security are correlated in trustee-based social authentications.
In these attacks, an attacker initially obtains a small number
of compromised users which we call seed users. The attacker
then iteratively attacks other users according to some priority
ordering of them. In an attack trial to a user Alice, if at least
k trustees of Alice are already compromised, then the attacker
can easily compromise Alice; otherwise the attacker can (op-
tionally) send spoofing messages to Alice’s uncompromised
trustees to request verification codes, and such spoofing attacks
can succeed with some probability [24]. Our attacks are similar
to forest fires which start from a few points and spread among
the forests. Thus, we call them forest fire attacks.
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2Second, we construct a probabilistic model to formalize the
threats of forest fire attacks and their costs for attackers. For
each user, our model computes the compromise probability
that the user is compromised after a given number of attack
iterations. With those compromise probabilities, our model
calculates the expected number of compromised users and
treats it as the threat. Moreover, our model quantifies the costs
of sending spoofing messages for attackers.
Third, we explore various scenarios where seed users have
different properties and introduce strategies to construct pri-
ority orderings. For instance, one scenario could be that seed
users happen to be appointed as trustees of a large number of
users. Furthermore, we discuss a few defense strategies. For
example, one strategy is to guarantee that no user is appointed
as a trustee of a large number of users.
Results and impact of our work: We apply our framework to
extensively evaluate various concrete attack scenarios, defense
strategies, and the impact of system parameters using three
real-world social networks. First, we find that forest fire attack
is a potential big threat. In particular, when all the users with
at least 10 friends in these social networks adopt trustee-
based social authentications, an attacker can compromise tens
of thousands of users in some cases even if the number
of seed users is 0; using a small number (e.g., 1,000) of
seed users, the attacker can further compromise two to three
orders of magnitude more users with low (or even no) costs
of sending spoofing messages. Second, our defense strategy,
which guarantees that no users are selected as trustees by
too many other users, can decrease the expected number of
compromised users by one to two orders of magnitude and
increase the costs for attackers by a few times in some cases.
Third, we find that, in contrast to existing work [7, 8, 24]
where the recover threshold is set to be three, it could be set
to be four to better balance between security and usability.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We propose a novel framework of attacks, which we call
forest fire attacks.
• We construct a model to formalize the threats of forest
fire attacks and their costs for attackers. Moreover, we
explore various attack scenarios and defense strategies.
• We apply our framework to extensively evaluate these
attack scenarios, defense strategies, and the impact of
system parameters using three real-world social networks.
Our results have strong implications for designing more
secure trustee-based social authentications.
II. BACKGROUND
First, we overview how a trustee-based social authentication
system works. Then, we introduce two basic concepts, i.e.,
social networks and trustee networks.
A. Trustee-based social authentications
A trustee-based social authentication includes two phases:
• Registration Phase. The system prepares trustees for
a user Alice in this phase. Specifically, Alice is first
authenticated with her main authenticator (i.e., password),
and then a few (e.g., 5) friends, who also have accounts
in the system, are selected by either Alice herself or the
service provider from Alice’s friend list and are appointed
as Alice’s trustees.
• Recovery Phase. When Alice forgets her password or
her password was compromised and changed by an
attacker, she recovers her account with the help of her
trustees in this phase. Specifically, Alice first sends an
account recovery request with her username to the ser-
vice provider which then shows Alice an URL. Alice
is required to share this URL with her trustees. Then,
her trustees authenticate themselves into the system and
retrieve verification codes using the given URL. Alice
then obtains the verification codes from her trustees
via emailing them, calling them, or meeting them in
person. If Alice obtains a sufficient number (e.g., 3)
of verification codes and presents them to the service
provider, then Alice is authenticated and is directed to
reset her password. We call the number of verification
codes required to be authenticated the recovery threshold.
Note that it is important for Alice to know who her trustees
are in the Recovery Phase. Schechter et al. [24] showed
that users cannot remember their trustees via performing user
studies. Thus, a usable trustee-based social authentication
system should remind Alice of her trustees.
Next, we provide details about two representative trustee-
based social authentication systems which were implemented
by Microsoft [24] and Facebook [7, 8], respectively.
Microsoft’s trustee-based social authentication: Schechter
et al. [24] designed and built a trustee-based social authen-
tication system and integrated it into Microsoft’s Windows
Live ID service. In the Registration Phase, users provide four
trustees. The recovery threshold is three. Moreover, users will
be reminded of their trustees.
Facebook’s trustee-based social authentication: Facebook’s
trustee-based social authentication system is called Trusted
Friends [8], whose improved version is Trusted Contacts [7].
In the Registration Phase of Trusted Contacts, a user selects
three to five friends from his or her friend list as trustees. The
recovery threshold is also set to be three. Facebook does not
remind a user of his or her trustees, but it asks the user to type
in the names of his or her trustees instead. However, once the
user gets one trustee correctly, Facebook will remind him or
her of the remaining trustees.
Both trustee-based social authentication systems ask users
to select their own trustees without any constraint. In our
experiments (i.e., Section VII), we show that the service
provider can constrain trustee selections via imposing that no
users are selected as trustees by too many other users, which
can achieve better security guarantees. Moreover, none of these
work performed rigorous studies to support the choice of three
as the recovery threshold. In fact, our experimental results
show that setting the recovery threshold to be four could better
balance between security and usability.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a forest fire attack to a service with 6 users. The shown graph is the trustee network. Recovery threshold is three.
Users u5 and u6 have adopted the trustee-based social authentication. The attack ordering is u6, u5, u4. (a) u1, u2, and u3 are compromised
seed users. (b) u6 is compromised because three of his or her trustees are already compromised. (c) u5 is compromised because the attacker
already compromises his or her trustees u3 and u6 and obtains a verification code from u4 via spoofing attacks. (d) u4 is not compromised
because he or she hasn’t adopted the service.
B. Social networks and trustee networks
We denote a social network as G = (V,E), where each node
in V corresponds to a user in the service and an undirected
edge (u, v) represents that users u and v are friends. Moreover,
in a trustee-based social authentication system, users and their
trustees form a directed network. We call this directed network
a trustee network and denote it as GT = (VT , ET ), where a
node in VT is a user in the service and a directed edge (v, u)
in ET means v is a trustee of u.
One fundamental challenge in trustee-based social authen-
tication is how to construct the trustee network from a social
network so that the system is more secure.
III. THREAT MODEL
We first introduce attackers’ background knowledge and
then a novel family of attacks which we call forest fire attacks.
A. Background knowledge
We assume that attackers know the trustee network in the
target service. The reasonableness of this threat model is
supported by two evidences. First, attackers can obtain users’
usernames. A username is usually a string of letters, digits,
and special characters. Moreover, Bonneau et al. [3] showed
that a majority (e.g., 96% in their studies) of websites enable
attackers to probe if a string is a legitimate username. Thus,
strong attackers, who have enough resources (e.g., a botnet)
to perform username probings, can obtain all usernames in
the target service. Second, Schechter et al. [24] found, via
performing user studies, that users cannot remember their own
trustees. Therefore, a usable trustee-based social authentication
system must remind users of their trustees. Recall that an
account recovery request only requires a username. As a result,
an attacker could send account recovery requests with the
collected usernames to the service provider which reminds the
attacker of the trustees of each user.
Next, we take Facebook as an example to show how an
attacker obtains the trustee network. First, Facebook provides
an interface1 to test if a user (represented by a username, real
1https://www.facebook.com/login/identify?ctx=recover
name, or email address) is in Facebook. Thus, the attacker can
perform username probings to collect Facebook users. Second,
the attacker sends account recovery requests to Facebook using
the collected names. Recall that Facebook shows all trustees to
a user once the user correctly types in one trustee. Moreover,
Bilge et al. [4] showed that an attacker can obtain friend lists
of around 90% of Facebook users. Thus, the attacker can
repeatedly guess the trustees of a user until success. We note
that Facebook only allows a user to try around 10 times for
typing in the trustees within a short period of time. However,
such rate limit cannot prevent a strong attacker from obtaining
the trustee network eventually, though it can increase the
attacker’s cost.
B. Forest fire attacks
Our forest fire attacks consist of Ignition Phase and Prop-
agation Phase.
Ignition Phase: In this phase, an attacker obtains a small
number of compromised users which we call seed users. They
could be obtained from phishing attacks, statistical guessings,
and password database leaks, or they could be a coalition of
users who collude each other. Indeed, a large number of social
network accounts were reported to be compromised,2 showing
the feasibility of obtaining compromised seed users.
Propagation Phase: Given the seed users, the attacker itera-
tively attacks other users. In each attack iteration, the attacker
performs one attack trial to each of the uncompromised users
according to some attack ordering of them. In an attack trial to
a user u, the attacker sends an account recovery request with
u’s username to the service provider, which issues different
verification codes to u’s trustees. The goal of the attacker is
to obtain verification codes from at least k trustees. If at least k
trustees of u are already compromised, the attacker can easily
compromise u; otherwise, the attacker can impersonate u and
send a spoofing message to each uncompromised trustee of u
to request the verification code. Schechter et al. [24] found that
such spoofing attacks can successfully retrieve a verification
code with an average probability around 0.05.
2For instance, Gao et al. [9] showed that around 57,000 out of 3,500,000
(1.6%) Facebook accounts were compromised.
4TABLE I: Representative notations used in our model.
Notations Definitions
G = (V,E) The trust social network among the users in the service
GT = (VT , ET ) The trustee network among the users in the service
Va The set of users who adopt the trustee-based social authentication service
u A user in the service
Γ(u) The set of friends of u
ΓT (u) The set of trustees of u
ΓT,o(u) The set of users who select u as a trustee
do(u) The number of users who select u as a trustee
mu The number of trustees of u
k Recovery threshold, i.e., u is authenticated if u obtains verification codes from k of mu trustees
ns The number of seed users compromised in the Ignition Phase
S The set of seed users that are compromised in the Ignition Phase
S The strategy to select the seed users
n The number of attack iterations in the Propagation Phase
O(t) The attack ordering according to which the attacker performs attack trials to the users in the tth attack iteration
O The ordering construction strategy
p
(t)
s (v, u) The probability of obtaining a verification code from u’s trustee v via spoofing attacks in the tth attack iteration
ps Average spoofing probability
p
(t)
c (u) The probability that u is compromised in the tth attack iteration
p
(t)
c (VT ) The vector of compromise probabilities of all users in the tth attack iteration
p
(t)
a (u) The probability that u is compromised in at least one attack iteration after t attack iterations
p
(t)
a (VT ) The vector of aggregate compromise probabilities of all users after t attack iterations
nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O) The expected number of compromised users
cI The cost of obtaining the set of compromised seed users in the Ignition Phase
c(t)(u) The expected number of spoofing messages that are sent in the attack trial to u in the tth attack iteration
ce The average cost per spoofing message
c(GT , k, ns, n,S,O) The expected cost
p
(t)
r (u) The recovery probability of u in the tth attack iteration
pr Average recovery probability
Although the spoofing attacks can help attackers compro-
mise more users, we want to stress that they are optional.
We will show in our experiments that an attacker can still
compromise a large number of users even if he does not use
spoofing attacks to retrieve verification codes in some cases.
Example: Figure 1 shows a forest fire attack to a service
with 6 users. Note that a good attack ordering can increase
the probability that users are compromised and decrease the
number of required spoofing messages (see our experimental
results in Section VII). In our example, if the attacker performs
attack trials with an attack ordering of u5, u6, u4, the attacker
needs to spoof both u4 and u6 to compromise u5, which
requires two spoofing messages. However, with the attack
ordering of u6, u5, u4, the attacker only needs to spoof u4
to compromise u5, which only requires one spoofing message
and could succeed with a higher probability.
Compromised users could be recovered: Users could
recover their compromised accounts to be uncompromised
after they or the service provider detect suspicious activities
of the accounts. For instance, a trustee of u receiving a
spoofing message might report to u, who then changes his
or her password; the phenomenon that a trustee requests lots
of verification codes for different users within a short period
of time is a possible indicator of forest fire attacks, and the ser-
vice provider could then notify the users, whose trustees have
requested verification codes, to change passwords. Moreover,
a recovered account could be compromised again in future
attack iterations, e.g., when the trustees of the recovered user
are still compromised. The process of being compromised and
being recovered could repeat for many attack iterations.
IV. SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we introduce our security model to formalize
the threats of forest fire attacks and their costs for attackers.
Table I summarizes our important notations.
A. Formalizing threats
We use ΓT (u) and mu = |ΓT (u)| to denote the set
of trustees and the number of trustees of u, respectively.
We denote by ΓT,o(u) the set of users who select u as a
trustee. We model a set of seed users (denoted as S) is
obtained by a seed users selection strategy, and we denote
it as S. In the tth attack iteration, the attacker performs attack
trials to uncompromised users according to an attack ordering
O(t). The attack orderings are constructed by an ordering
construction strategy which is denoted as O.
We call the probability that u is compromised in the tth
attack iteration compromise probability, and we denote it as
p
(t)
c (u). u is eventually compromised if it is compromised
in at least one attack iteration. Thus, we denote by p(t)a (u)
the probability that u is compromised after t attack iterations,
and p(t)a (u) is called aggregate compromise probability. The
compromise probabilities in the tth attack iteration depend on
the aggregate compromise probabilities after (t − 1) attack
iterations. Moreover, we use p(t)c (VT ) and p
(t)
a (VT ) to rep-
resent the vectors of compromise probabilities and aggregate
compromise probabilities of all users in VT , respectively.
Algorithm 1 shows our model of forest fire attacks. Next,
we elaborate the iterative computations of compromise prob-
abilities and aggregate compromise probabilities.
51) Ignition Phase: If u is a seed user, then u’s initial
compromise probability is 1, otherwise we model u’s initial
compromise probability as 0. Formally, we have the initial
compromise probability of u as follows:
p(0)a (u) = p
(0)
c (u) =
{
1 if u ∈ S
0 otherwise
(1)
2) Propagation Phase: The key component is to update the
aggregate compromise probability of u when the aggregate
compromise probabilities of u’s trustees are given.
Obtaining one verification code: We denote by A the event
that the attacker obtains a verification code from a trustee v
of u and by p(t)(v, u) the probability that A happens in the
tth attack iteration. Moreover, we denote the event that v is
already compromised when the attacker attacks u in the tth
attack iteration as B. Then we can represent p(t)(v, u) as:
p(t)(v, u) = Pr(A)
= Pr(A|B)Pr(B) + Pr(A|¬B)Pr(¬B) (2)
, where ¬B represents that B does not happen. Next, we model
Pr(A|B), Pr(B), Pr(A|¬B), and Pr(¬B), respectively.
When B happens, the attacker can obtain a verification
code from v with a probability 1, i.e., Pr(A|B) = 1. Pr(B)
depends on whether the attacker attacks v before u or not. If
v is attacked before u, then the probability that B happens is
p
(t)
a (v), otherwise it is p
(t−1)
a (v). Formally, we have:
Pr(B) =
{
p
(t)
a (v) if v is ordered before u
p
(t−1)
a (v) otherwise
(3)
When B does not happen, the attacker can impersonate u
and send a spoofing message to v to request a verification code.
We call the probability that such spoofing attacks succeed
spoofing probability. Spoofing probability might be different
for different trustees. A trustee might behave differently to
spoofing messages impersonating different users because he
or she might have different levels of trusts with the users
that are impersonated. Moreover, spoofing probability might
be different in different attack iterations because trustees might
gradually become aware of the spoofing attacks. Thus, we
model the spoofing probability that the attacker obtains a
verification code from v in an attack trial to u in the tth attack
iteration as p(t)s (v, u), i.e., Pr(A|¬B) = p(t)s (v, u).
In summary, we have:
p(t)(v, u) ={
p
(t)
a (v) + p
(t)
s (v, u)(1− p(t)a (v)) if v is ordered before u
p
(t−1)
a (v) + p
(t)
s (v, u)(1− p(t−1)a (v)) otherwise
Computing compromise probabilities: Recall that u is
compromised if the attacker can obtain verification codes from
at least k trustees of u. Thus, given the natural assumption that
u’s trustees are independent, the compromise probability of u
in the tth attack iteration is calculated using the following local
update rule:
p(t)c (u) =
∑
φ
∏
v∈φ
p(t)(v, u)
∏
v∈ΓT (u)−φ
(1− p(t)(v, u)) (4)
Algorithm 1: Our Model of Forest Fire Attacks
Input: GT , k, p
(t)
s (v, u), ns, n, S , O, ce, cI , and p(t)r (u).
Output: nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O), c(GT , k, ns, n,S,O).
1 begin
2 //Selecting seed users in the Ignition Phase.
3 S ←− S(GT , ns)
4 //Calculating the compromise probabilities.
5 //Ignition Phase.
6 for u ∈ VT do
7 if u ∈ S then
8 p
(0)
c (u)←− 1
9 else
10 p
(0)
c (u)←− 0
11 end
12 p
(0)
a (u)←− p(0)c (u)
13 end
14 //Propagation Phase.
15 t←− 1
16 C ←− 0
17 while t ≤ n do
18 //Constructing an attack ordering.
19 O(t) ←− O(GT , p(t−1)a (VT ))
20 for i = 0 to O(t).size()− 1 do
21 u←− O(t)[i]
22 Apply Equation 4 to u.
p
(t)
a (u)←− 1− (1− p(t−1)a (u))(1− p(t)c (u))
23 p
(t)
a (u)←− (1− p(t)r (u))p(t)a (u)
24 c(t)(u)←− Apply Equation 10
25 C ←− C + c(t)(u)
26 end
27 t←− t+ 1
28 end
29 //The expected number of compromised users.
30 nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O)←−
∑
u∈VT p
(n)
a (u)
31 //The expected cost.
32 c(GT , k, ns, n,S,O)←− cI + ceC
33 return nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O), c(GT , k, ns, n,S,O)
34 end
, where φ ⊆ ΓT (u) and |φ| ≥ k.
Aggregating compromise probabilities: Assuming that
whether u is compromised in one attack iteration is indepen-
dent with whether u is compromised in another attack iter-
ation, we can iteratively compute the aggregate compromise
probability of u as follows:
p(t)a (u) = 1− (1− p(t−1)a (u))(1− p(t)c (u)) (5)
Compromised users can recover to be uncompromised: As
we have discussed in Section III-B, compromised users can
recover to be uncompromised and be compromised again due
to various factors. We call the probability that a compromised
user u recovers to be uncompromised in the tth attack iteration
recovery probability, and we denote it as p(t)r (u). Considering
6the recovery probability, we reformulate the aggregate com-
promise probability of u (i.e., Equation 5) as follows:
p(t)a (u) = (1− p(t)r (u))(1− (1− p(t−1)a (u))(1− p(t)c (u)))
Expected number of compromised users: Given a forest
fire attack specified by the seed users selection strategy S, the
number of seed users ns, the ordering construction strategy
O, and the number of attack iteratons n, we define the threat
of the attack as the expected number of users it compromises.
Moreover, we denote the expected number of compromised
users as nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O), and it is formalized as follows:
nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O) =
∑
u∈VT
p(n)a (u) (6)
B. Formalizing costs
We consider the attacker’s costs of obtaining seed users and
sending spoofing messages. Suppose the cost to obtain seed
users is cI . In the following, we quantify the cost of sending
spoofing messages.
In an attack trial to u, the attacker sends a spoofing message
to u’s trustee v when the following three independent events
happen: u is uncompromised, v is uncompromised, and among
the rest of u’s trustees, the number of compromised ones is
less than k.
In the tth attack iteration, the first event happens with a
probability (1− p(t−1)a (u)). We denote by q(t)(v, u) the prob-
ability that the second event happens, and q(t)(v, u) depends
on whether v is attacked before u or not. Formally, we have:
q(t)(v, u) =
{
1− p(t)a (v) if v is ordered before u
1− p(t−1)a (v) otherwise
(7)
, for any v ∈ ΓT (u). Moreover, the third event happens with
the following probability:
r(t)(v, u) =∑
φ
∏
w∈φ
(1− q(t)(w, u))
∏
w∈ΓT (u)−φ−{v}
q(t)(w, u) (8)
, where φ ⊆ ΓT (u)− {v} and |φ| < k.
Therefore, the expected number of spoofing messages (de-
noted as c(t)(v, u)) that the attacker sends to v in the attack
trial to u in the tth attack iteration is formalized as follows:
c(t)(v, u) = (1− p(t−1)a (u))q(t)(v, u)r(t)(v, u) (9)
So the total expected number of spoofing messages (denoted
as c(t)(u)) that the attacker sends in the attack trial to u in the
tth attack iteration is:
c(t)(u) = (1− p(t−1)a (u))
∑
v∈ΓT (u)
q(t)(v, u)r(t)(v, u) (10)
Thus, we obtain the total expected cost of performing a
forest fire attack as follows:
c(GT , k, ns, n,S,O) = cI + ce
n∑
t=1
∑
u∈VT
c(t)(u) (11)
, where ce is the average cost for the attacker to send one
spoofing message.
V. ATTACK STRATEGIES
The attacker could design the seed users selection strategy
and the attack ordering construction strategy to maximize the
expected number of compromised users. First, we show that
finding the optimal set of seed users and the optimal ordering
construction strategy is NP-Complete. Then, we explore var-
ious scenarios where seed users have different properties and
introduce two ordering construction strategies.
A. NP-Completeness
Given GT , k, ns, and n, the attacker essentially aims to
solve the following attack maximization problem:
Attack Maximization Problem:
nc(GT , k, ns, n) = maxS,O
nc(GT , k, ns, n,S,O)
We prove that this problem is NP-Complete. Please refer to
Appendix A for the proof.
B. Strategies for selecting seed users
A seed users selection strategy S is essentially to assign a
score which represents some metric of importance to each user
and to select ns users with the highest scores as seed users.
This is closely related to the node centrality problem [18] in
the network science community. In the following, we modify a
few node centrality heuristics as seed users selection strategies.
These strategies work on a trustee network, and we name them
with a prefix ‘S-’ to indicate they are used to select seed users.
S-Random: As a baseline, this strategy assigns a random
score ranging from 0 to 1 to each user in the trustee network.
S-Degree: Intuitively, if a user u is selected as a trustee by
more users, then compromising u will increase the compro-
mise probabilities of more users and thus the attacker has an
opportunity to compromise more users. Therefore, S-Degree
treats the number of users that select u as a trustee (i.e.,
outdegree of u in the trustee network) as u’s score.
S-BadRank: S-BadRank, adapted from BadRank [2], per-
forms a random walk on the trustee network. Specifically, S-
BadRank starts a random walk from u that is picked uniformly
at random. Then S-BadRank iteratively performs one of the
two operations: choosing a trustee v of u uniformly at random
and walks to v with a probability 1− α, and selecting a user
w uniformly at random from the entire trustee network and
walks to w with a probability α. Traditionally, α is called the
restart probability.
The random walk will converge to a stationary probability
distribution over all users in the trustee network. The stationary
probability of u is roughly the frequency with which the
random walk visits u and is used as u’s score. Intuitively, S-
BadRank tends to assign a high score to a user that is selected
by many users as a trustee because he or she has a large chance
to be visited by the random walk.
S-Closeness: The attacker could also select users that are
close to all other users in the trustee network as seed users be-
cause compromising them could help the attacker compromise
other users more quickly. This intuition is formally captured by
7Algorithm 2: O-Gradient
Input: GT = (VT , ET ) and p
(t)
a (VT ).
Output: An ordering O of all users in VT .
1 begin
2 for u ∈ VT do
3 for v ∈ ΓT (u) do
4 //Probability of getting one verification code
pv ←− p(t)a (v) + p(t+1)s (v, u)(1− p(t)a (v))
5 end
6 pu ←−
∑
φ
∏
v∈φ pv
∏
v∈ΓT (u)−φ(1− pv), where
φ ⊆ ΓT (u) and |φ| ≥ k.
7 q
(t)
a (u)←− 1− (1− p(t)a (u))(1− pu)
8 end
9 for u ∈ VT do
10 d
(t)
a (u)←− q(t)a (u)− p(t)a (u)
11 end
12 O ←− Sort users decreasingly using d(t)a (u)
13 return O
14 end
the closeness metric [22]. Specifically, we define the distance
between v and u as the length of the shortest directed path
whose tail is v and whose head is u. Then the closeness of
u is defined as the inverse of the sum of its distances to all
other users, and it is treated as u’s score. In our experiments,
we adopt the approximate algorithm developed by Okamoto
et al. [19] to find the top-ns users with the highest closeness
scores since it is scalable to large networks.
C. Strategies for constructing attack orderings
We name these strategies with a prefix ‘O-’ to indicate that
they are used to construct attack orderings. Essentially, these
strategies assign a score to each user in the trustee network
and rank them in a decreasing order according to their scores.
O-Random: As a baseline, this strategy assigns a random
score ranging from 0 to 1 to each user in the trustee network.
O-Gradient: Algorithm 2 shows O-Gradient. Given the
current aggregate compromise probabilities p(t)a (VT ) of all
users after t attack iterations, the attacker calculates a predicted
aggregate compromise probability q(t)a (u) for each user u by
simulating an attack trial to u. Note that q(t)a (u) might be
different from p(t+1)a (u) because q
(t)
a (u) is calculated with the
fixed aggregate compromise probabilities of u’s trustees while
p
(t+1)
a (u) is updated with the newest aggregate compromise
probabilities of u’s trustees. Intuitively, a user u with a larger
difference of q(t)a (u)−p(t)a (u) could be attacked with a higher
priority because such an attack trial could bring more increase
to the aggregate compromise probabilities of users who select
u as a trustee. Thus, O-Gradient calculates the differences of
q
(t)
a (u) − p(t)a (u) for all users and ranks them decreasingly
according to these differences.
VI. DEFENSE STRATEGIES
We discuss potential defense strategies from three aspects,
i.e., hiding trustee networks from attackers, mitigating spoof-
ing attacks, and constraining the selection of trustees.
A. Hiding trustee networks
Preventing attackers from obtaining a trustee network is an
essential step towards the defense of forest fire attacks. In
the currently deployed social authentication systems, attackers
can obtain a trustee network because users need to know their
trustees to retrieve verification codes from them in the Re-
covery Phase. An alternative implementation of the Recovery
Phase is that the service provider directly sends verification
codes to the trustees of the user when receiving an account
recovery request, and the trustees are required to actively share
the verification codes to the user. This implementation does
not require users to know their trustees, and thus it is hard for
attackers to obtain the trustee network.
However, this implementation is unreliable and could annoy
users and their trustees. Specifically, u’s trustees might already
forget they are trustees of u, and thus they might simply treat
those verification codes as spams and not share them with
u, which results in low reliability. Moreover, users do forget
who their trustees are [24], and thus it is highly impossible
for u to actively request verification codes from its trustees. If
the trustees do actively share the codes with u, then attackers
can frequently send account recovery requests to the service
provider which immediately sends verification codes to the
trustees, and the trustees will (possibly) frequently share the
codes with u, which could be annoying to both u and its
trustees. More seriously, after u’s trustees realize that the
verification codes are just spams, they might not actively share
the verification codes with u even if she is really trying to
recover her account, which again results in low reliability.
Therefore, hiding trustee networks from attackers sacrifices
reliability, which possibly explains why existing trustee-based
social authentication systems didn’t adopt this alternative
implementation of the Recovery Phase.
B. Mitigating spoofing attacks
Another way to defend against forest fire attacks is to
remind trustees of not sharing verification codes via messages.
This strategy is not novel, and we include it for completeness.
Indeed, existing social authentication systems [7, 24] already
try to mitigate spoofing attacks. For instance, Microsoft’s sys-
tem [24] asks a trustee why she is requesting the verification
code and encourages her to share the code with the user via
phone or meeting in person.
However, it is hard to control how trustees share the
verification codes with others in practice. Indeed, an attacker
can still obtain a verification code from a trustee with an
average probability around 0.05 via message-based spoofing
attacks in the Microsoft’s system [24]. It is an interesting
future work to design better user interfaces to further reduce
this spoofing probability.
C. Constraining trustee selections
Finally, we introduce strategies to contrain trustee selec-
tions, which are easy to implement and effective at defending
8against forest fire attacks. We consider both local trustee
selection strategies and global trustee selection strategies. A
local trustee selection strategy is based on a user’s local social
network structure while a global one is based on the entire
social network structure. We name these strategies with a
prefix ‘T-’ to indicate that they are used to select trustees.
We note that how users select their trustees in a real
trustee-based social authentication system such as Facebook’s
Trusteed Contacts is not clear and thus might not be one of
our strategies. However, our work focuses on a comparative
study about different trustee selection strategies and can shed
light on which strategy is more secure.
1) Local trustee selection strategies: For a user u, a local
trustee selection strategy essentially computes a score s(v, u)
for each friend v of u and then selects mu friends with the
highest scores as u’s trustees.
T-Random: As a baseline, T-Random assigns a random
number ranging from 0 to 1 as the score s(v, u).
T-CF: As was shown by Gilbert and Karahalios [10], the
number of common friends of two users is an informative
indicator about the level of trust between them. Thus, one
speculation is that a user might select friends with which he
or she shares many common friends as trustees. To quantify
the security of this speculation, we design the strategy T-CF
(i.e.,T-CommonFriends), which uses the number of common
friends shared by u and his or her friend v as the score s(v, u),
i.e., s(v, u) = |Γ(v) ∩ Γ(u)|.
However, there are two drawbacks of T-CF. First, the fact
that u shares many friends with a popular user v doesn’t
necessarily mean that u and v have a high level of trust because
it is normal for many friends of u to be in v’s friend list.
Second, if a common friend of u and v is a popular user, then
sharing him or her doesn’t necessarily indicate a high level of
trust between u and v. Next, we introduce two strategies to
overcome the two drawbacks, respectively.
T-JC: To overcome the first drawback of T-CF, we design
the trustee selection strategy T-JC (i.e., T-JaccardCoefficient),
which uses the Jaccard Coefficient [12] of the two sets Γ(u)
and Γ(v) as the score s(v, u), i.e., s(v, u) = |Γ(v)∩Γ(u)||Γ(v)∪Γ(u)| .
T-AA: To overcome the second drawback, we design the T-
AA (i.e., T-AdamicAda) strategy, which uses Adamic-Ada [1]
similarity between u and v as the score s(v, u). Adamic-
Ada similarity penalizes each common friend by its popularity
(i.e., the number of friends). Formally, we have s(v, u) =∑
w∈Γ(v)∩Γ(u)
1
log|Γ(w)| .
2) Global trustee selection strategies: Global strategies
leverage the entire social network structure and thus are
potentially better than local strategies.
T-Degree: As we discussed in Section V-B, seed users could
be those having large outdegrees in the trustee network, and
they could enable an attacker to compromise many other
users. Thus, we propose the T-Degree strategy to minimize
the maximum outdegree in the trustee network. Intuitively, T-
Degree constrains that no users are selected as trustees by too
many other users.
Algorithm 3 shows our T-Degree strategy. T-Degree selects
trustees for users one by one. For each user u that has
Algorithm 3: T-Degree
Input: G = (V,E), Va, and mu of all u ∈ V .
Output: A trustee network GT = (VT , ET ).
1 begin
2 VT ←− V
3 for u ∈ VT do
4 do(u)←− 0
5 end
6 for u ∈ Va do
7 φ←− ∅
8 while |φ| < mu do
9 v ←− argminv∈Γ(u)−φ do(v)
10 φ←− φ ∪ {v}
11 do(v)←− do(v) + 1
12 ET ←− ET ∪ (v, u)
13 end
14 end
15 return GT = (VT , ET )
16 end
TABLE II: The number of users, the number of users who have at
least 10 friends, the fraction of such users, and the average number
of friends of such users in the three social networks.
Flickr Google+ Twitter
# Nodes 1,551,824 10,230,332 21,297,771
# Nodes (degree ≥ 10) 233,067 3,144,370 4,540,483
Fractions 15% 31% 21%
Average degrees 75 27 107
adopted the trustee-based social authentication service, T-
Degree selects his or her mu friends whose current outdegrees
in the trustee network are the smallest as u’s trustees; ties are
broken uniform at random.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental setups
Parameter settings: Unless otherwise mentioned, we set n =
10, mu = m = 5, k = 3,3 ns = 1, 000, p
(t)
r (u) = pr = 0
for every u, and α = 0.9;4 we use the O-Gradient strategy
to construct attack orderings, i.e., O=O-Gradient; according
to Schechter et al. [24], the average message-based spoofing
probability is around 0.05, thus we set p(t)s (v, u) = ps = 0.05
for every edge (v, u) ∈ ET .
Datasets: We use three social network datasets. They are
Flickr, Google+, and Twitter. We obtained the Flickr dataset
from Mislove et al. [17]. In this social network, we take each
user as a node and connect two users if they are in each other’s
friend lists. We obtained a Google+ snapshot from Gong et
al. [11]. In this social network, each node is a Google+ user
and two users are connected if they are in each other’s circles.
The Twitter dataset was obtained from Kwak et al. [15]. In
3This is the recovery threshold chosen by the Microsoft’s and Facebook’s
trustee-based social authentication systems.
4We tried α from 0 to 0.9 with a step size 0.1, and we found that S-BadRank
with α = 0.9 achieves the largest expected number of compromised users.
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Fig. 3: The expected number of compromised users for different seed users selection strategies and trustee selection strategies. We find that,
with 1,000 seed users, an attacker can compromise two to three orders of magnitude more users with low costs of sending spoofing messages
in some cases. However, our strategy T-Degree can decrease the expected number of compromised users by one to two orders of magnitude.
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(b) Number of spoofing messages
Fig. 2: Impact of attackers’ resources and attack orderings on Flickr.
First, we find that an attacker can perform forest fire attacks with low
costs. Second, we find that O-Gradient compromises more users and
requires fewer spoofing messages than O-Random when the attacker
performs a given number of attack iterations.
this social network, each node is a Twitter user and two users
are connected if they follow each other.
Since a trustee-based social authentication requires a user
to have enough number of friends from which trustees can be
selected, we assume that users who have at least 10 friends
are appropriate to adopt the trustee-based social authentication
service. In our experiments, we consider the worst scenario in
which every such user has adopted the trustee-based social
authentication service.5 Table II shows the statistics of our
interest in the three social networks.
For simplicity, we only show results on the Flickr dataset
in some of our experiments, but similar conclusions are
applicable to the other two datasets.
B. Experimental results
Impact of attackers’ resources and attack orderings: The
number of attack iterations is closely related to the costs
of sending spoofing messages. Figure 2 illustrates the ex-
pected number of compromised users (Figure 2a) and the
expected number of required spoofing messages (Figure 2b)
as a function of the number of attack iterations on Flickr
5The fewer users adopt the trustee-based social authentication, the more
secure it is. An extreme case is that if no user adopts the system, then the
forest fire attacks cannot be spreaded from the seed users at all.
for the ordering construction strategies O-Random and O-
Gradient. The seed selection strategy is S-Degree and the
trustee selection strategy is T-CF.
First, we find that a strong attacker (e.g., an attacker
controlling a botnet) can perform firest fire attacks with low
costs. This is because such an attacker can send out billions
of messages per day with a low cost [25], which is far more
than that needed to spoof trustees in our experiments.
Second, we find that the ordering construction strategy O-
Gradient compromises more users and requires fewer spoofing
messages than O-Random when the attacker performs a given
number of attack iterations. In other words, given the number
of spoofing messages the attacker can send, the attacker should
adopt O-Gradient to construct the attack orderings.
Similar conclusions are applicable to other combinations of
seed selection strategies and trustee selection strategies. Thus,
we don’t show the corresponding results for conciseness.
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Fig. 4: The expected number of required spoofing messages for
different seed users selection strategies and trustee selection strategies
on Flickr. We observe that our strategy T-Degree can increase the
attacker’s costs by a few times in some cases.
Impact of seed users selection strategies and trustee
selection strategies: Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the expected
number of compromised users and the expected number of
required spoofing messages respectively for different seed
selection strategies and trustee selection strategies. We can
draw a few conclusions.
First, we find that forest fire attack is a potential big threat.
For instance, when the seed users are appointed as trustees of
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Fig. 5: The ratios between the expected number of users that
are compromised without spoofing attacks and those with spoofing
attacks for different seed selection strategies and different trustee
selection strategies on Flickr. We find that the expected number of
compromised users only decreases by 20% to 25% when the attacker
does not use spoofing attacks in some cases, which implies that
spoofing attacks are optional.
many users (i.e., S-Degree) and the trustees are selected by
T-CF, the attacker can compromise around 190,000, 660,000,
and 3,760,000 users in the three social networks, respectively.
This represents a growth of two to three orders of magnitude
from the 1,000 seed users. However, our strategy T-Degree can
decrease the expected number of compromised users by one
to two orders of magnitude. For instance, the expected number
of compromised users of T-Degree is 53 times smaller than
that of T-CF on Twitter when the seed users selection strategy
is S-Degree. Moreover, our strategy T-Degree can increase the
costs for attackers by a few times in some cases. For instance,
the cost of sending spoofing messages of T-Degree is 3 times
bigger than that of T-CF and that of T-AA on Flickr when
the seed users are appointed as trustees of many users. The
reason is that the trustee networks constructed by T-Degree
are more loosely connected, which makes it harder for forest
fire attacks to propagate among them.
Second, even if the seed users are distributed among a social
network uniformly at random (i.e., S-Random), the attacker
can still compromise dozens of times more users. For instance,
the attacker can still compromise 65 to 80 times more users
in Twitter depending on how trustees are selected.
Third, T-JC works better than T-AA which performs better
than T-CF for all seed users selection strategies except S-
Random. We find that the outdegree distributions of the
trustee networks constructed by T-CF are skewed towards high
degrees the most while those constructed by T-JC are skewed
towards low degrees the most. Thus, the seed users in the
trustee networks constructed by T-JC have lower outdegrees
than those constructed by T-AA, which have lower outdegrees
than those constructed by T-CF. As a result, T-JC performs
better than T-AA and T-AA performs better than T-CF.
Impact of spoofing attacks: The attacker can choose not
to send any spoofing message, which requires no costs of
sending spoofing messages. Moreover, spoofing probabilities
might decrease as the attacker performs more attack iterations
because trustees become aware of the spoofing attacks, and we
consider an extreme case where spoofing probabilities are zero
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Fig. 6: Impact of m, k, ps, ns, and pr . We find that k = 4 is a good
tradeoff between security and usability.
in all attack iterations. That spoofing probabilities are zero is
equivalent to that the attacker does not use spoofing attacks in
terms of the number of compromised users.
Figure 5 shows the ratios between the expected number
of users that are compromised without spoofing attacks and
those with spoofing attacks for different seed users selection
strategies and trustee selection strategies on Flickr.
We find that, without spoofing attacks, the expected number
of compromised users only decreases by 20% to 25% when
the trustee selection strategy is T-CF or T-AA and the seed
users selection strategy is not S-Random, which means that
the attacker can still compromise orders of magnitude more
users and that spoofing attacks are optional in some cases.
Impact of mu, k, p
(t)
s (v, u), ns, and p
(t)
r (u): Towards this
end, we assume that the attacker and the defender are making
their best choices, i.e., the seed selection strategy is S-Degree
and the trustee selection strategy is T-Degree. For simplicity,
we assume mu = m for all users u who adopt the trustee-
based social authentication service and p(t)s (v, u) = ps for
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all edges (v, u) in the trustee network and attack iterations.
Moreover, we consider zeroth-order approximation of recovery
probabilities, i.e., we use the average recover probability to ap-
proximate recover probabilities of all users in different attack
iterations. In other words, p(t)r (u) = pr for all users and attack
iterations. pr represents the average fraction of compromised
users that realize their accounts are compromised and take
actions to recover them in each attack iteration.
Figure 6 shows the impact of m, k, ps, ns, and pr. Note
that the x-axis in Figure 6d is the percentage of users that
adopt the trustee-based social authentication service. We have
a few observations.
Naturally, we observe that the expected number of compro-
mised users decreases with k and pr, and it increases with
m, ps, and ns. Moreover, the trends are qualitatively similar
on the three social networks for each of the five parameters,
which indicates the generality of our results.
The parameters m and k balance between security and
usability. Specifically, a smaller m or a bigger k makes the
system more secure but less usable. Figure 6b shows that the
expected number of compromised users decreases dramatically
when k increases from 1 to 4. For instance, the expected
number of compromised users decreases by around one order
when k changes from 3 to 4. However, the decrease is not
significant when k increases from 4 to 5. Existing trustee-
based social authentication systems [7, 24] set k to be 3; our
observations indicate that they could set k to be 4 to better
balance between security and usability.
We find that the expected number of compromised users
changes dramatically when ps is around 0.2 on all the three so-
cial networks. Moreover, almost all users that have adopted the
trustee-based social authentication service are compromised
when ps is bigger than around 0.3. Our results imply that it is
urgent to mitigate the spoofing attacks via designing better user
interfaces to remind users of not easily sharing the verification
codes to others via messages.
The expected number of compromised users increases dra-
matically with ns in the range where ns is small. This implies
that obtaining a few more seed users enables the attacker to
compromise significantly more users when the number of seed
users is small. Moreover, even if the number of seed users is 0,
the attacker can still compromise thousands of nodes in Flickr
and tens of thousands of nodes in Google+ and Twitter.
The expected number of compromised users significantly
decreases with pr. For instance, the number of compromised
users decreases by one order in all the three social networks
when around 40% of compromised users recover to be un-
compromised in each attack iteration (i.e., pr = 0.4). Our
results imply that it is important for users to take actions to
recover their accounts quickly when suspicious activities of
their accounts are detected.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A greedy seed users selection strategy: An attacker could
use a greedy strategy to select seed users. Specifically, the
attacker selects seed users one by one. To select a seed user,
the attacker iterates over each user that is not a seed user yet;
for each such user u, the attacker pretends that u is a seed user
and simulates our security model to predict the corresponding
expected number of compromised users; and the user u which
increases the expected number of compromised users by the
most is added as a new seed user.
We compared this greedy strategy with other seed users
selection strategies using a small subnetwork sampled from
the Google+ dataset and found that it can compromise more
users. However, it is not scalable to large social networks. It
is an interesting future work to make the strategy scalable.
Community-based trustee selection strategy: We can also
design a trustee selection strategy based on some notion of
community. Specifically, we could select trustees for users
such that the trustee network consists of isolated communities,
which could constrain the propagation of forest fire attacks. It
is an interesting future work to explore these community-based
trustee selection strategies.
Limiting the issuance of verification codes: A compromised
user u might request a verification code from the service
provider when the attacker performs an attack trial to a user
who selects u as a trustee. Thus, a compromised user who is
a trustee of many other users might request many verification
codes in each attack iteration. Therefore, limiting the number
of verification codes that each user can request within a given
period of time (e.g., one hour) can slow down forest fire
attacks. It is an interesting future work to explore the impact
of such rate limitings on forest fire attacks and what strategies
attackers can adopt to maximize the number of compromised
users given a time constraint.
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Social authentications
Depending on how friends are involved in the authentication
process, social authentications can be classified into trustee-
based and knowledge-based social authentications. In trustee-
based social authentications [4], the selected friends aid the
user in the authentication process. Knowledge-based social
authentication, however, asks the user questions about his or
her selected friends, and thus friends are not directly involved.
Trustee-based social authentication systems: Authentica-
tion is traditionally based on three factors: something you know
(e.g., a password), something you have (e.g., a RSA SecurID),
and something you are (e.g., fingerprint).
Brainard et al. [4] proposed to use the fourth factor, i.e.,
somebody you know, to authenticate users. We call the fourth
factor trustee-based social authentication. Originally, Brainard
et al. combined trustee-based social authentication with some
other factor as a two-factor authentication mechanism. It was
later adapted to be a backup authenticator [7, 8, 24]. For
instance, Schechter et al. [2] designed and built a prototype
of trustee-based social authentication system which was inte-
grated into Microsofts Windows Live ID system. Moreover,
Facebook designed Trusted Friends in October, 2011 [8], and
it was improved to be Trusted Contacts [7] in May, 2013.
Knowledge-based social authentication systems: Such so-
cial authentications are still based on something you know.
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Yardi et al. [26] proposed a knowledge-based authentication
system based on photos to test if a user belongs to the
group (e.g., interest groups in Facebook) that he or she tries
to access. Facebook recently launched a similar photo-based
social authentication system [21], in which Facebook shows
a few photos of a friend of a user and asks the user to name
the friend. Such system essentially relies on the knowledge
that the user knows the person in the shown photos. However,
recent work has shown, via theoretical modeling [14] and
empirical evaluations [20], that photo-based social authenti-
cations are not resilient to various attacks such as automatic
face recognition techniques, questioning their use as a backup
authentication mechanism.
B. Diffusion models
Our forest fire attacks essentially describe diffusion pro-
cesses in a trustee network. We review a few representative
diffusion models from different research areas and discuss the
differences between them and our work.
Updates propagation models: Malkhi et al. [16] proposed
the l-Tree propagation model to diffuse updates among a
large distributed system of data replicas, some of which might
exhibit Byzantine failures. Their model assumes a point-to-
point communication for each pair of nodes. A node that
already receives the update is called active, otherwise it is
called inactive. Initially, a small set of nodes are active. Each
active node is associated with a candidate set of nodes. In
each iteration, each active node is allowed to send the update
to at most F nodes which are selected from the corresponding
candidate set uniformly at random. An inactive node becomes
active if it receives the update from at least k other nodes.
There are two key differences between our forest fire attacks
and the l-Tree propagation model. First, an uncompromised
(i.e., inactive) node can receive verification codes (i.e., up-
dates) from uncompromised trustees via spoofing attacks in
forest fire attacks while an inactive node can only receive
updates from active nodes in the l-Tree model. Second, in each
iteration, each compromised node sends verification codes to
all nodes that select it as a trustee in forest fire attacks while
an active node can only send the update to at most F nodes
in the l-Tree model.
Information propagation models: Models for how products
and innovations propagate on a social network have been
studied in various domains such as viral marketing and the
spread of technological innovations. These models can be
divided into two categories [13]: linear threshold model and
independent cascade model. Again, a node is said to be active
if it already adopts the corresponding product or innovation,
otherwise it is inactive. In both models, a small set of nodes
are active initially.
Linear threshold model: In this model, each node u is
associated with a threshold, which indicates the fraction of u’s
friends that must become active before u becomes active. The
propagation proceeds deterministically in discrete iterations: in
the tth iteration, an inactive node becomes active if its fraction
of active friends is no less than u’ activation threshold.
Independent cascade model: Different from the linear
threshold model, the independent cascade model proceeds in
discrete iterations according to the following randomized rule:
when a node u first becomes active in the tth iteration, it
has a single chance to activate each of its currently inactive
friend v and succeed with some probability which encodes the
influence of u to v.
The key difference is that verification codes can be propa-
gated from an uncompromised (i.e., inactive) node to another
uncompromised node via spoofing attacks in forest fire attacks
while an inactive node can only be activated by active nodes in
the linear threshold model and the independent cascade model.
Moreover, an active node only has a single chance to activate
its friends in the independent cascade model while a compro-
mised node can send verification codes to the uncompromised
nodes that select it as a trustee as many times as it wants.
Epidemic propagation models: Epidemic propagation mod-
els describe the propagations of various contagious diseases
such as sexually transmitted diseases, inuenza, and measles.
One popular epidemic model is the so-called SIR model
(Chapter 21 of [6]). Different from the above reviewed models
in which each node can be either active or inactive, SIR model
assumes that each node can be in one of the three states,
i.e., susceptible, infectious, and removed. Initially, a set of
nodes are infectious and all other nodes are susceptible. Each
infectious node u remains infectious for a fixed number of
iterations I . In each of the I iterations, u has some probability
of passing the disease to each of its susceptible neighbors.
After I iterations, u becomes removed, which means that u
cannot catch nor propagate the disease any more.
Again, a susceptible (i.e., uncompromised) node can only
be influenced by infectious (i.e., compromised) nodes in the
SIR model, which is different from the forest fire attacks.
Moreover, the state removed is not meaningful in the context
of forest fire attacks since a node could be compromised again
even if it recovers the account and resets the password.
Summary: The key difference between forest fire attacks
and previous diffusion models lies in the spoofing attacks.
Specifically, an uncompromised node can obtain verification
codes from its uncompromised trustees via spoofing attacks
in the forest fire attacks while an inactive or susceptible node
can only be influenced by its active or infectious neighbors in
previous diffusion models.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provide the first systematic study about
the security of trustee-based social authentications. First, we
introduce forest fire attacks. In these attacks, an attacker first
obtains a small number of compromised seed users and then
iteratively attacks the rest of users according to a priority
ordering of them. Second, we construct a probabilistic model
to formalize the threats of forest fire attacks and their costs for
attackers. Third, we introduce a few strategies to select seed
users and construct priority orderings, and we discuss various
defense strategies. Fourth, via extensive evaluations using three
real-world social network datasets, we find that forest fire
attack is a potential big threat. For instance, with a small
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number (e.g., 1,000) of seed users, an attacker can further
compromise two to three orders of magnitude more users in
some scenarios with low (or even no) costs of sending spoofing
messages. However, our defense strategy, which guarantees
that no users are trustees of too many other users, can decrease
the number of compromised users by one to two orders of
magnitude and increase the costs for attackers by a few times
in some cases. Moreover, the recovery threshold should be set
to be 4 to better balance between security and usability.
A few future directions include evaluating forest firest at-
tacks on real social authentication systems such as Facebook’s
Trusted Contacts, designing new attack and defense strategies,
and optimizing forest fire attacks given a time constraint.
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APPENDIX A
THE ATTACK MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM IS NP-COMPLETE
To prove the hardness of the attack maximization problem,
we only need to show the hardness of a corresponding
decision problem, i.e., given GT , k, ns, n, and an integer l,
it is NP-Complete to decide whether nc(GT , k, ns, n) ≥ l.
This follows from a reduction from the NP-Complete Set
Cover problem: given a ground set X = {x1, . . . , xa},
and a collection of its subsets S1, S2, · · · , Sm, we want to
determine if there exists t subsets Si1 , Si2 , · · · , Sit such that
Si1 ∪ Si2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sit = X . We show that this can be viewed
as a special case of the attack maximization problem, where
the spoofing probabilities and recovery probabilities are all 0.
Given any instance of a set cover problem, we construct a
corresponding trustee network as follows: there are k nodes for
each Sj , and one node for each xi; each xi has all the k copies
of Sj as trustees iff xi ∈ Sj ; in addition, for each Sj we have
a2k2 dummy nodes each of which designates the k copies of
Sj as trustees. Then the Set Cover problem is satisfiable iff
the attacker can compromise at least l = ta2k2 + tk+a nodes
with a seed set whose size is tk, i.e., nc(GT , k, tk, n) ≥ l.
